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We have finished Klal 9. The purpose of this Klal was to learn about broad klalim which come up regarding melachos of Shabbos. We will discuss a few other concepts not discussed by the Chayei Adam.
The Maggid Mishneh brings out a concept that the kavanah for a melacha can play a role in the definition of the melacha. We mentioned an example of a person who pulls off a splinter from a piece of wood with the intent of making a toothpick. One tanna holds it is an issur deoraysa of makeh bepatish or boneh. If a person pulls off the splinter without any intent, no melacha has been performed–it is not a toothpick, because the person had no intent for it to become a toothpick. Thus, we see that the intent for melacha can be definitional in the action.
The melachos which fall under this rule are the melachos in which intent plays a role in defining the melacha. For example, cooking creates a physical change in food that is independent of a person’s thoughts. There may be leniencies due to davar she’eino miskavein, etc, but the act is objectively an act of melacha.
However, certain melachos have a subjective component to them, which if not added, detracts from the melacha status of the action. For example,makeh bepatish definitely lends itself to such an idea. The completion of an item definitely has a subjective element to it. That is where the idea of the Maggid Mishneh applies.
Another example is the melacha of tzod. Tzod is to take a living animal and enclose it to the point that it loses its independence. That is a physical reality and not affected by intent. But there is also another criteria that the point of the tzod must be in order to have the item.
If one captures the item only in order to prevent it from attacking them, one would have thought it is a melacha she’eina tzricha legufah. However, the Rambam paskens that melacha she’eina tzricha legufah is chayav, yet also paskens that tzod to prevent attack is muttar. If so, the Rambam is clearly not understanding this caveat as a melacha she’eina tzricha legufah. The Biur Halacha explains that the Rambam understands that the definition of tzod includes trapping something in order to take possession of it. Hence, we see that here is an element of intent inherent in the melacha, and when that intent is missing, the melacha has not been performed.
We will discuss other melachos to which this concept applies in upcoming shiurim, be’ezras Hashem.
Summary
- For certain melachos, such as 1) makeh bepatish and 2) tzod, intent can be definitional to the melacha, and if the full criteria of intent is missing, the melacha has not been transgressed. It may therefore be muttar, pending certain concerns.
- For most other melachos, lack of intent will only consider it davar sheaino miskaven, to which psik reisha would apply, or melacha shaino tzrichah legufah, which are both assur either medeoraysa or mederabbanon.
