We have finished siman 1, where the Chayei Adam discussed three of the five criteria for tzad mideoraysa. Before we move to the last two criteria, the Chayei Adam will discuss the level of domestication of an animal. If the animal is fully domesticated, trapping it is not assur because it anyways was not going to run away. An animal which is semi-domesticated, such as a farm animal, will react to being caught or trapped, but it always returns by the end of the day. The Chayei Adam will discuss this question in siman 3 and 4.
In siman 2, the Chayei Adam discusses whether it is muttar or assur to close a door or window in situations in which something will inevitably get trapped in the room, but the person’s intention was to prevent cold, for safety, or the like.
Normally, we would approach this question based on the rules of davar she’eino miskavein, and since the person’s intent is for something else, it should be muttar. However, if it is a psik reisha (inevitable for tzad to occur), it becomes assur. The concept of davar she’eino miskavein applies to all issurim of the Torah, which would indicate that the issur would apply even on a deoraysa level, and trapping in this scenario would be considered an issur deoraysa. However, the Rosh writes that regarding Shabbos, a davar she’eino miskavein, even if it is a psik reisha, is lacking in meleches machsheves, so it will remain a derabanan.
We could differentiate between tzad deoraysa and tzad derbanan. In other words, if closing the window or door means that the animal is now easily accessible, it is considered tzad deoraysa. However, if the room is large enough for the animal to initially evade capture, it is tzad miderabanan. We could then be meikil for davar she’eino miskavein when it is an issur derabanan. If so, it would come out that in situations which are a question of tzad derabanan, it would be muttar to perform the action if the tzad occurs as a davar she’eino miskavein.
Another answer to this question is based on the Rashba. The Rashba writes something extraordinary. He writes that tzad is a chiddush in that one is chayav for tzad even if one does not do anything directly to the animal, but just changes the reality around the animal.
Rav Shimon Shkop understands that the Rashba is teaching us that the uniqueness of tzad by enclosure is such that it will only apply when a person has intent to perform tzad. If they have no intention for the tzad, it is not even considered the melacha, so the question of davar she’eino miskavein does not need to be considered. In contrast, for example, if a person turns on a stove for the purpose of heating the room, if there is a pot on the stove, they are chayav for bishul even though it was not their stated purpose, because it is a psik reisha that it will be cooked.
If we apply Rav Shimon Shkop’s understanding of the Rashba to our question, it would be matir any situation–even when the tzad is deoraysa–in which the action of tzad is a davar she’eino miskavein and primarily for another purpose. We will discuss this question further in the upcoming shiur, be’ezras Hashem.
Summary
There is a question whether it is muttar to perform tzad as a davar she’eino miskavein (ie, for another purpose, but inevitably tzad occurs). According to one understanding, it will only be muttar in questions of tzad derabanan, and according to another, it would be muttar even in questions of tzad mideoraysa.
