We have finished siman 2, where we learned that the Chayei Adam is meikil to allow tzad miderabanan when there is also an assur action which is a davar she’eino miskavein. We learned that this heter is either based on the fact that it is a psik reishain a derabanan d’lo nicha lei, or based on the Rashba. We will clarify an important point in the understanding of the Rashba.
To review, the Rashba said that tzad is a chiddush in that one is chayav for tzad even if one does not do anything directly to the animal, but just changes the reality around the animal.
Rav Shimon Shkop understands that the Rashba is teaching us that the uniqueness of tzad by enclosure (as opposed to active trapping on one’s hand) is such that it will only apply when a person has intent to perform tzad.
However, the Mishnah Berurah discusses the Rashba and understands the Rashba as describing a universal concept. He understands that the Rashba is explaining that if an action is muttar, it does not become assur based on the person’s additional intention alone. The Rashba brings a proof from a Yerushalmi, which brings a case of throwing a net into the water to save a person’s life, but while the net is in the water, it catches some fish as well. The Yerushalmi concludes that throwing the net is muttar even if the person had the intention to catch the fish in addition to saving the person. Since the action is inherently an action of saving a life, the fact a person had intent for something else is irrelevant. The Rashba brings this case as a proof because it seems clear that once a person is involved in a muttar action, their additional intent is not going to make the action assur.
However, the Mishnah Berurah disagrees, and holds we cannot necessarily extrapolate from this case, because it is a chiyuv–one must throw the net and save the person’s life. Just like wrong intentions do not absolve a person from their chiyuv, it could be argued that other intentions do not change the action either. When the action is a reshus, such as closing a window, one could argue that intention, or multiple intentions, becomes problematic.
The Mishnah Berurah writes that we do not pasken in accordance with the Rashba, and sends the learner to another of his seforim, Ahavas Chesed. There, he brings a Gemara in Bava Metzia about a lost object. Part of taking care of a lost object includes maintaining that it does not get damaged. At the time of Chazal, maintenance included airing out the garment. Thus, for example, if a person finds a tapestry, they have a chiyuv to take it out every 30 days and air it out. The Gemara discusses whether a person can air out the tapestry at a time when they know they will impress someone, such as at the same time they have an important guest coming. Thus, they will use the object for two purposes, to air it out (which is a chiyuv) and for their personal benefit. The Gemara concludes that it is assur. It would seem that having multiple intentions would be assur, and the Mishnah Berurah uses this case to question the idea of the Rashba. Again this indicates that the Mishnah Berurah understands the Rashba in regards to all halachos, not only the melacha of tzad.
The Chofetz Chaim also wrote the sefer Machane Yisroel, which was meant to help people drafted to the army in keeping basic halacha. There, he uses the Rashba as an eitza to help minimize chilul Shabbos, not in conjunction with tzad, but in regards to hotzaah. Thus, it appears that b’shaas hadechak, he is willing to rely on the Rashba, even though he prefers not to rely on the Rashba, not even in the melacha of tzad itself.
Summary
There is a question whether it is muttar to perform tzad as a davar she’eino miskavein (ie, for another purpose, but inevitably tzad occurs). The Chayei Adam paskens it will only be muttar in cases of tzad miderabanan, but assur in cases of tzad mideoraysa.
One way to understand the Chayei Adam is based on the Rashba, that when a person does not have intent for tzad, there is no issur whatsoever. However, the Mishnah Berurah concludes that we do not pasken in accordance with the Rashba, and the psak of the Chayei Adam is either based
- a) on the fact that it is a davar she’eino miskavein on an issur derabanan when there is tzaar,
- b) only also in conjunction with being lo nicha lei.
- c) we can rely on the Rashba for a derabanan when there is also a need, like tzaar.
