Rephael Cattan

We are continuing in siman 5. Yesterday, we learned the Noda Biyehuda regarding hunting for sport and need to make a correction. The Noda Biyehuda holds that a person does not transgress tzaar baalei chaim when they hunt for sport, because it is technically a human purpose. Nevertheless, he discourages it because it is maaseh

  We are continuing in siman 5. The siman began with discussing using a dog to capture another animal, and the cases in which one would be chayav mideoraysa and chayav miderabanan.    The Chayei Adam continues, and writes that there is an additional concern of muktzah in these cases. In the way the Chayei

  We are continuing in siman 5, where the Chayei Adam is discussing the use of an animal (eg, a dog) as part of the process of tzad. It is interesting to point out that the Chayei Adam presents this case differently than its source in the Rambam. The Chayei Adam presents the case as

We are continuing in siman 3, discussing the concept of b’nei tarbus, an animal which is domesticated.  It is clear that if an animal rebels and has become a wild animal it is no longer considered domesticated. There is a question regarding something which was in a state of capture and then lost its full

We are beginning siman 3. We learned that there are 5 conditions necessary for an action to be considered tzad deoraysa. In siman 1, we learned the first 3 conditions: that it is b’mino nitzad, it is not already ill or infirm that it could not anyways escape, and it has to be trapped in

  We have finished siman 2, where we learned that the Chayei Adam is meikil to allow tzad miderabanan when there is also an assur action which is a davar she’eino miskavein. We learned that this heter is either based on the fact that it is a psik reishain a derabanan d’lo nicha lei, or

  We are continuing in siman 2, where we learned that the Chayei Adam is matir performing tzad miderabanan as a davar she’eino miskavein (ie, for another purpose, but inevitably tzad occurs).   It is a machlokes achronim whether the Chayei Adam permits a davar she’eino miskavein in a case of melacha derabanan, or only

  We are continuing in siman 2. The Chayei Adam writes that if a bird flies into a house through an open window, it is assur to shut the window. It is assur even though the act of tzad will only be assur miderabanan, meaning, the bird will still have enough room to fly around

  We have finished siman 1, where the Chayei Adam discussed three of the five criteria for tzad mideoraysa. Before we move to the last two criteria, the Chayei Adam will discuss the level of domestication of an animal. If the animal is fully domesticated, trapping it is not assur because it anyways was not

  We are continuing in siman 1. The Chayei Adam discussed the first three conditions for tzad, that the animal is b’mino nitzad, the animal was not already sick enough to be considered trapped, and that the act of tzad confines it in a way that it is easily accessible to the human.    Regarding

We have begun siman 30, which discusses the melacha of tzad. As an introduction, we learned five conditions which are necessary to consider the action of the melacha of tzad on a torah level. In any of these cases, even if one does not reach the Torah level of issur, the action will still be

  We are beginning Klal 30, which discusses the melacha of tzad. This melacha is unique in certain ways, so we will begin with some examples.   The most common example of tzad is taking a living being into one’s hands. Before, it was a free animal, and now it is under the control of