We are continuing in siman 6, discussing the concept of davar she’eino miskavein. To review, Rav Shimon permits a situation in which a person is engaged in and has intention for one, muttar action, and another, assur, action occurs simultaneously. When it comes to issurei Torah, Hashem is not concerned with the results inasmuch as the human element of the action. Results belong to Hashem; actions are under the purview of the person. For example, if a person is forced to bow down to an animal as avodah zarah, the Chemdas Shlomo holds that the animal is not treated as avodah zarah (which would make it assur in hanaah), since the human intention was not present in making the item assur. Similarly, the Rambam holds that a person who is forced to serve avodah zarah is not chayav misah. Although they were mevatel the mitzvas asei of venikdashti, of performing kiddush Hashem, they are not chayav for avodah zarah, because they are not considered to have performed avodah zarah. The person’s body was used to bow down to avodah zarah, but the human intention was missing.
Over here, davar she’eino miskavein functions in a similar manner. When a person drags a bench across the dirt, their intention is to move the bench, and they have no intention for the process of making a ditch.
On the other hand, the concept of davar she’eino miskavein is different from safeik deoraysa lechumra in that safeik deoraysa lechumra applies when the reality is already on the ground, such as when there is already a food of unknown kashrus in front of the person. Once the reality is already present, we can no longer say that the person does not have intention for an assur outcome, because the possibility for the assur outcome is already inherently present in the action.
When the action is a psik reisha, it means that it is inevitable that the additional action will occur. In our case, if the bench is very heavy, it is inevitable that the ditch will be created when the bench is moved. Rav Shimon agrees that if it is a psik reisha that the additional action will occur, it is assur. One approach in the achronim is that since it is inevitable, we assume that he is aware of the resultant consequence, and if he did it anyway, he is making a conscious decision to perform this additional action, so the person can be held responsible for it. Another approach is that rather than probing the psychological depths of the person, there is a mathematical equation in play, which is that if the first action and second action are equal, once a person has kavanah for the first action, they have kavanah for the second action as well.
Summary
Davar she’eino miskavein is the concept that if a person has no intention for a secondary action, they are not chayav for it, because issurim are primarily defined by their intention rather than their outcome.
On the other hand, a psik reisha is the concept that if a secondary action is inevitable, a person is chayav for it, either because it is considered that the person is making a conscious decision to perform it, or because it is practically considered a part of the first action.
This concept differs from safeik deoraysa lechumrah in that safeik deoraysa lechumrah applies to an item or situation in which the reality is already present and known, so it is impossible for one to claim they did not have intention for it.
